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tAbstract
We present an institutional ethnography and historical case study of the Vigía Chico
fishing cooperative, located in the community of Punta Allen within the Biosphere
Reserve of Sian Ka’an, México. The top producer of spiny lobster (Panulirus argus) in
the state of Quintana Roo for over 30 years, this cooperative has been claimed as an
example of a sustainable artisanal fishery. To better understand and assess this success
story, we performed an in-depth study of multiple factors to analyze their influence on
the cooperative’s success. The indicators selected were level and form of social organization,
resilience to socio-environmental perturbations, changes in fishing gear, and the fishing
concession as avenue to cementing institutional success. We conducted ethnographic
fieldwork over five months, complemented by an in-depth analysis of the cooperative
assembly’s minutes. We found that the knowledge the cooperative acquired of the
functioning of Mexican public policies was a factor in their success. Cooperative leaders
were able to translate that knowledge in ways that benefitted the cooperative, enabling
them to build a set of policy-responsive operational rules that could be effectively
applied to artisanal fisheries more broadly. The isolated conditions of the area and
the presence of natural perturbations such as hurricanes forced the community to
increase their willingness to cooperate, and improved their capacity to respond as a
group to perturbations. These successes in turn demonstrated the value of cooperative
approaches to achieve individual and collective livelihood goals, within and beyond
fishing. Such approaches have been further enhanced by the incorporation of academic
knowledge and scientific techniques. We conclude that Punta Allen is a successful
example of a community that has managed to creatively engage public policy
instruments and translate them into effective local practices, enabling organizational
persistence despite repeated changes in policies governing fisheries in Mexico.
Keywords: Small-scale fisheries; Fishing cooperatives; Fisheries governance;
Common-pool resources; Fisheries conservationIntroduction
In Latin America, most artisanal fisheries are degrading rapidly, provoking widespread
concerns about overexploitation of fisheries resources (Defeo and Castilla 2005). Many
of these fisheries began as open access regimes under national jurisdiction. Initially,
products from artisanal fisheries supplied domestic markets. Once national markets
were integrated into the global economy, fishery products became export commodities,
which often resulted in overexploitation of the resource (Defeo and Castilla 2005;2015 Méndez-Medina et al. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
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have resulted in intensive research interest in successful artisanal fisheries (Defeo and
Castilla 2005; Gallardo et al. 2011; Gutiérrez et al. 2011; Orensanz et al. 2013).
One salient conclusion has been that rights-based management systems tend to func-
tion better for sustainable artisanal fisheries. Case study examples from Latin America
illustrate the benefits of such systems, such as the Seris in Sonora, Mexico (Basurto
et al. 2012; Orensanz et al. 2013), and the Juan Fernández Archipelago lobster fishery
(Jasus frontalis) in Chile (Orensanz et al. 2013). Other rights-based systems studied in-
clude the Territorial Use Rights for Fishing in North Central Chile loco abalone fisher-
ies (Concholepas concholepas) (Defeo and Castilla 2005; Gallardo et al. 2011; Orensanz
et al. 2013), and the concessions of Central Baja California, Mexico (Orensanz et al.
2013; McCay et al. 2014). The Punta Allen spiny lobster fishery (Panulirus argus) in the
Mexican Caribbean has also been extensively profiled (Seijo and Fuentes 1989; Schlager
and Ostrom 1992; Seijo 1993; Defeo and Castilla 2005; Seijo 2008; Sosa-Cordero et al.
2008; Brenner 2010). On the other hand, rights-based management alone is not the key to
successful and sustainable fisheries. Research has shown that if divergent interests among
stakeholders are not reconciled, serious conflicts may arise, threatening both the resource
base and local livelihoods. Examples of less successful rights-based artisanal fisheries in-
clude that for the sea urchin (Loxechinus albus) in Chile (Defeo and Castilla 2005), and
the Galapagos sea cucumber (Isostichopus fuscus) of Ecuador (Orensanz et al. 2013).
The Juan Fernández lobster fishery in Chile shares some characteristics with the
Punta Allen fishery. Both share informal territorial access rights. Local fishers designate
individual fishing spots, and in both cases non-invasive fishing gear is employed. Both
are single-species lobster fisheries, with the benefit of high commercial value. Both de-
veloped their fisheries in geographic isolation, a characteristic that forced them to adapt
and respond to environmental perturbations as a group. Unlike in Punta Allen, how-
ever, in the Juan Fernández case, the government has not recognized the system of
traditional rights. This renders their system vulnerable to the incorporation of disrup-
tive, externally imposed rules (Ernst et al. 2013).
Gutiérrez et al. (2011) analyzed 130 cases of fisheries with community-based co-
management, and found them to be a key management strategy across countries with
different degrees of economic development (Punta Allen was included in the study).
The authors found that the attributes contributing to co-management success are the
presence of strong leadership, followed by the implementation of community quotas,
social cohesion, and protected areas limiting access to non-group members. All these
elements are present in Punta Allen. However, the presence of these attributes does not
fully explain the success of the case study, either.
The example of the Maine American lobster fishery (Homarus americanus) (Ernst
et al. 2013) contributes a few additional elements to the analysis of successful artisanal
fisheries. The Juan Fernández, Punta Allen and Maine fisheries all feature informal ter-
ritorial rights. Maine lobster fishers access a common territory, in contrast to the two
other cases, where fishers hold rights to specific fishing locations individually (Ernst
et al. 2013; St. Martin 2001). In Maine, a well-rooted conservation ethic among local fishers
in the industry resulted in laws that heavily support and facilitate resource conservation. For
example, these laws established minimum and maximum lobster size measurements for
extraction, a prohibition on the extraction of “berried” lobsters (egg-carrying females),
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mentioned laws is their compatibility with existing territorial systems (Acheson and
Brewer 2003), a characteristic that the Maine fishers share with those of Punta Allen.
This successful integration of local rules with law and policy—in conjunction with fac-
tors such as relatively easy access to high-market-value species and isolated geographic
conditions—have resulted in a very particular form of social organization. That
organizational form represents the essential ingredient in the maintenance of a system
of rights that sustains the life of the fishery developed by the Vigía Chico Cooperative
of Punta Allen in the Mexican Caribbean. Tracing the evolution of these distinctive
conditions in the Punta Allen case thus has the potential to inform both artisanal fish-
eries management policy, and community practice in far-flung locales.Setting the scene
In Mexico, fisheries are listed as secondary activities in State development strategies be-
cause of their minor contribution to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Nonetheless,
small-scale fisheries make significant economic contributions. According to official
data, in Mexico 70 % of fisheries resources are fully exploited, 10 % are in potential
development and 20 % are in or close to collapse (Arreguín-Sánchez 2006). Artisanal
fisheries in the country represent a huge management challenge. Catch levels are not
fully recorded, and poaching and violation of closed seasons occur along the coasts of
Mexico. The role of artisanal fisheries in the worldwide fishery crisis is often ignored
or regarded as marginal compared to the effects of industrial fishing (Defeo and Castilla
2005). Nonetheless, small-scale overfishing can lead to serious local environmental and
economic consequences.
In the Southern Yucatan Peninsular state of Quintana Roo, fishing has major social,
political and commercial significance. Along the state’s 900-km coastline, social life is
organized by a system of artisanal fisheries. Experts consider these fisheries to be highly
organized, second only to those of Baja California, nationally (Hidalgo and Méndez
2007). The system is dominated by cooperatives formed by local fishers, with little in-
volvement of the outside commercial sector (Sosa-Cordero and Ramírez-González
2001). The fishery resources that historically have had the greatest economic signifi-
cance for the state are the spiny lobster (Panulirus argus), shrimp (Farfantepenaeus
brasiliensis), and the queen conch (Strombus gigas). Spiny lobster production has sig-
nificant economic importance for Quintana Roo. From 2000 to 2008, 165.1 tons were
produced (counting both tails and live lobsters). The catch represented six percent of
the state’s fishery production; fisheries, in turn, represent 40 % of the state’s total gross
product (Sosa-Cordero 2011).
There are three fishing areas in the state: North, Central and South. Each area has
different levels of development, habitat characteristics and types of fishing gear
employed in lobster catching. In the Central area, the focus of our study, the predomin-
ant types of gear used are sombras, or shadesa, and jamob, a type of net (Seijo 2008).
This area includes the bays of La Asención and Espíritu Santo, both located with the
boundaries of the Sian Ka’an Biosphere Reserve.
Spiny lobster abundance was a decisive factor and one of the principal drivers of the
formation of the first cooperatives in Quintana Roo in the 1950s (César and Arnáiz
Méndez-Medina et al. Maritime Studies  (2015) 14:12 Page 4 of 191986). After the 1970s, the activity lost importance in Federal development strategies
(Sosa-Cordero and Ramírez-Gonzalez 2011). When conservation emerged as an im-
portant issue in Federal environmental development concerns in the 1990s, lobster
fishing was identified as a threat to the Mesoamerican Barrier Reef. Fisheries became a
key target of State strategies for coastal management (Velez et al. 2014). These chan-
ging socio-environmental circumstances make the lobster fishery of Punta Allen a valu-
able case study. Despite these apparently adverse conditions and the increasingly bleak
scenario of many fisheries globally, the cooperative has emerged as a success story.
The Vigía Chico lobster cooperative of Punta Allen is located in what is today the
Sian Ka’an Biosphere Reserve. As an instance of a sustainable artisanal fishery coexist-
ing with marine conservation, the case has been frequently analyzed. The establishment
of property rights over marine space and the efficacy of cooperative members’ harvest-
ing techniques have drawn the attention of many researchers (Seijo and Fuentes 1989;
Seijo 1993, 2008; Defeo and Castilla 2005; Sosa-Cordero et al. 2008; Brenner 2010). To
better understand the cooperative’s success, we employed a historical perspective and
an ethnographic lens. This combination of approaches facilitates an analysis of the
community’s interaction with changing state policies and institutions.
The lobster fishery of Punta Allen has been studied previously using an institutional
analysis framework (Seijo 1993; Cochran 1998). The framework analyzes how collectively
managed fisheries function, how group members are accepted or rejected, and whether
possession of these rights to common property permit or prohibit the holder’s sale of the
resource. Institutional analysis is a well-recognized analytical approach. It defines institu-
tions as the shared conceptions that humans use in recurring situations, which are orga-
nized by rules, norms and strategies (Ostrom 2007). By the term rules we refer to:
“The result of implicit or explicit efforts by a set of individuals to achieve order and
predictability within defined situations by: (1) creating positions (e.g., member,
convener, agent, etc.); (2) defining how participants enter or leave positions; (3)
agreeing on which actions participants in these positions are required, permitted, or
forbidden to take; and (4) stating which outcome participants are required,
permitted, or forbidden to affect.” (Ostrom 1986:5).
We can see examples of these operational rules when fishers specify what types of
fishing gear are permitted within a fishing ground (Schlager and Ostrom 1992:251).
The rules that create and enforce property rights regimes play a primary role in institu-
tional analysis. Rules can also be understood as the variety of rights and their allocations
to particular stakeholders or categories of stakeholders (Poteete 2010). We understand
“rights” as particular actions that are authorized (V Ostrom and John 1976). Rights are a
product of rules, and thus not equivalent to rules (Schlager and Ostrom 1992). The
institutional analysis framework has been invaluable in understanding the organization of
fisheries and other governance regimes around the world (Schlager and Ostrom 1992;
Jentoft 2004; Basurto and Coleman 2010; Gallardo et al. 2011; Basurto et al. 2012).
By employing a historic and ethnographic approach to the Punta Allen case, we seek
to deepen the understanding of how this common property right of use has come into
existence. The factors affecting contextual emergence of common property rights of
use remain a vital question (Kadekodi 2004), and the principal concern of our paper.
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We conducted our case study on the Javier Rojo Gómez fishing colony—the official name
of Punta Allen—within the perimeter of the Sian Ka’an Biosphere Reserve, Quintana Roo,
Mexico (Fig. 1). Demarcation of the Sian Ka’an Biosphere Reserve began in 1982. It was
gazetted in 1986, in a process led by the Research Center of Quintana Roo (CIQROO)
with support from the National Council of Science and Technology (CONACYT). At the
time of its demarcation, the only human settlements recognized within its boundaries
were Punta Allen and Punta Herrero. Today María Elena, another fishing camp belonging
to the Cozumel fishing cooperative, is also recognized.
The Sian Ka’an Biosphere reserve has an area of 652,193 hectares, of which approxi-
mately 120,000 are marine. The marine portion includes an 110 km-long continuous
barrier reef, which makes it a focal point for the preservation of coastal ecosystems.
This position also makes the territory of Sian Ka’an a priority focus for the tourism
industry. The reserve encompasses a transition zone between terrestrial and marine
ecosystems, containing an extraordinary diversity of environments in good condition.
However, its poor soils are not suitable for agricultural activities. Due to a warm and
humid climate, the region features mesic forests, flooded forests and mangroves (INE
1996). Hurricanes, northerlies (nortes), and droughts periodically affect the area.
For many years, the extraction of gum (chicle) was the main productive activity in the
region, together with timber extraction and copra plantations for coconut oil produc-
tion. Between 1960 and 1980, timber extraction faltered before an increasing scarcity of
commercial timber species, due to overexploitation, and the chicle bubble popped with
the emergence of synthetic gum. Copra production declined precipitously due to “lethal
yellowing”, a viral disease of the coconut palm. Given this grim economic scenario,
local populations began to exploit marine resources through fishing. To ensure their re-
source use rights, in 1968 they established the “Vigía Chico Cooperative Society for Fishery
Production” (Sociedad Cooperativa de Producción Pesquera Vigía Chico), followed in 1970
by the “Javier Rojo Gomez Fisheries Camp” (Punta Allen) in Ascension Bay (Brenner 2010).
Today Punta Allen is highly dependent on the extraction of fishery resources (primarily
spiny lobster) and tourist activities. In Ascension and Espiritu Santo Bays (located at the
center and south of the Sian Ka’an Reserve, respectively), the use of casitas, or capture
shades, and jamo as fishing gear currently dominate (Seijo 1993; Sosa-Cordero et al. 2008).
Ethnographic fieldwork was conducted from February to May 2013 and in July of the
same year. The first author conducted in-depth interviews with 30 members of the co-
operative, using a snowball sampling technique (Biernacki and Waldorf 1981). Guest et al.
(2006) recommend conducting 30 to 50 interviews to allow the ethnographic researcher
to achieve saturation of information on a particular topic, while capturing variability, for
the proposes of thematic analysis. The first author interviewed current leaders of the lob-
ster cooperative, as well as founding members, and accompanied some of them during
their working hours (both off-season and in the fishing season). During ethnographic
fieldwork, she spoke with leaders of the cooperative, and with some of the families op-
posed to the current Board of Directors, to triangulate the degree of legitimacy of the
shared access rules. Ethnographic fieldwork additionally included interviews with resi-
dents who were not current cooperative members. The first author conducted four semi-
structured interviews with officials of the National Commission of Natural Protected
Areas (CONANP), and one informal anonymous interview with an official of the National
Fig. 1 Study area, showing location of the Sian Ka’an Biosphere Reserve
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of non-governmental organizations working in the study area. Finally, she interviewed
three fishermen who no longer live in the community, but who had been founding mem-
bers of the cooperative.
We conducted a review of the cooperative’s historical documents, including records
of the assemblies and meetings of the Board of Directors during the cooperative’s first
20 years of existence. We triangulated this information with a review of historical lit-
erature covering 100 years of public policy in Mexico. This enabled us to situate our
understanding of the process of cooperative decision-making over time. We also traced
how informal institutions and relationships between Punta Allen’s Vigía Chico Co-
operative and a variety of state-level stakeholders developed.
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The lighthouse keepers: the basis of social organization
The first settlers of the eastern coast of the Yucatan Peninsula (presently the State of
Quintana Roo) were descended from the Chontal, a Mayan ethnic group. The Chontal
brought their prowess in navigation from the State of Tabasco, enabling them to master
the coast and coastal waters (César and Arnaíz 1990). During pre-Columbian times,
salt production and fishing were the main productive activities in Yucatan. Dating well
back into the pre-Colombian era, cultural exchange and trade existed throughout the
Caribbean (Thompson 1979). During the era of conquest English and French pirates
from the Caribbean islands repeatedly attacked the coast of Quintana Roo, making the
rapid settlement of the area by other Europeans impossible. Nevertheless, the Maya
were able to establish trade agreements and alliances with the pirates. These relations
were retained during subsequent periods of repopulation.
Throughout the nineteenth century, the Yucatán Peninsula witnessed numerous bat-
tles between incoming settlers and the Mayan residents. The most significant conflict
in the area’s history was the Caste War (1847 to 1901), which lasted more than half a
century. At the end of the Caste War the population, who had fled the region for de-
cades, began to return. Repopulation began in the south of the state and was made offi-
cial with Mexican state promotion of the establishment of Rancho San Miguel (now
Cozumel Island). Subsequently the municipality of Isla Mujeres was established on the
eponymous island—named for its cultural importance as a site of Mayan women’s rites
of passage—and adjacent mainland. Regional resettlement occurred very slowly, as the
territory was isolated from the rest of the country, and navigating the Caribbean waters
remained difficult because of long hurricane periods (César and Arnaíz 1990).
At the beginning of the 20th century, the Mexican government established a Navy
presence along the coast. The Marine Corps recruited local fishermen from nearby Isla
Mujeres (César and Arnaíz 1992), who took advantage of local food resources like sea
turtles, and practiced small-scale fishing while simultaneously protecting Mexico’s
southern border. The establishment of lighthouses was another piece of the govern-
ment’s strategy to secure and populate Mexico’s southern border, thereby integrating
this marginal territory into the nation-state. Those in charge of the lighthouses became
the region’s first non-Mayan settlers, and extracted copra. These settlers earned their
living as farmers, fishers, and hunters, and created a form of social organization in the
territory based on extractive and farming practices (César and Arnáiz 1986; 1990).
The presence of lighthouse keepers along the coast was essential for the consolida-
tion of the social organization of most of the fisheries in Quintana Roo, and remains so
today. Punta Allen was part of that early-20th century network of lighthouses. Among
the records of the first lighthouse keeper we found the first formal proposal of how life
and work in the settler community should be organized. The Punta Allen fishers’ co-
operative initially operated out of the lighthouse keeper’s ranch, and one of the current
cooperative leaders is that founder son.Fisheries in Quintana Roo: the early years
During the early decades of the 20th century, the population living along the coast of
Quintana Roo remained fairly isolated from the rest of the country. Socio-economic
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by sea. Local populations traded lobster with the Cubans and Belizeans for scarce sta-
ples like sugar, alcohol, salt and oil, transforming a product used for local consumption
into a commercial commodity with high economic value. During these early years of
the lobster fishery anyone could harvest lobster without restrictions; most extraction
happened in areas close to the coast and reefs. Given resource abundance, lobster
fishing was easy and required little effort. As commercial exploitation increased, in-
terviewees say that the Cubans explained to one of the fishers how to use capture
shades (sombras) to make lobster fishing more economically attractive and labor-efficient.
At the national level, fisheries were consolidated during the 1930s and 1940s. Nation-
wide, the 1940s and 1950s were of great importance for the development of the fishing
industry. For Mexico, the Second World War boosted the fishing industry, creating an
increased demand for seafood products for the U.S. domestic market (Cruz-Ayala and
Igartúa-Calderón 2006). The introduction of diesel engines into local fishing practices
represented an adaptation of military technologies to civilian uses after WWII. During
the 1940s and 1950s, the government also promoted nationwide migration from urban
centers to coastal areas. As part of a territorial reorganization plan, government policy
concomitantly supported major investments in port infrastructure (Soberanes Fernández
1994; Cifuentes-Lemus and Cupul-Magaña 2002). In Quintana Roo, however, fisheries did
not gain economic importance until after Hurricane Janet, in 1955 (César and Arnaíz
1990). After Janet hit the coast, most of the region’s coconut palms were destroyed. Copra
extraction ceased to be economically viable, and the territory’s economic identity had to
be redefined. The first fishing cooperatives of Quintana Roo were formalized during this
time. Although initial efforts to encourage the creation of productive groups were made
during the government of Lázaro Cárdenas (1934–1940)c, it was not until the mid-1950s
to the late 1960s that extractive practices were organized by Cooperative Societies for
Fisheries Production (César and Arnáiz 1986).Drivers of success
Social organization
The Punta Allen community was established under particular socio-geographical condi-
tions. State development plans did not include significant infrastructure development
in the area, so the first inhabitants had to travel long distances on rough roads to reach
major regional urban centers like Felipe Carrillo Puerto and Chetumal. After copra
plantations began to decline in the 1950’s, fisheries came to the fore as an important
economic activity in Quintana Roo. During the early years of settler community forma-
tion, this isolation from the rest of the territory was decisive for the practices of pro-
duction and consumption enacted by fishing families and the few other individuals who
lived in the community.
The first settlers belonged to three extractive traditions: copra, the quintessential coastal
agriculture; fishing, practiced by fishers in Cozumel and Holbox, some of whom who
traveled to Punta Allen to continue plying their trade; and finally, other agricultural
and forestry traditions. One of the most important activities in these first years of the
settlement (1950’s-1970’s) was crocodile hunting (both of the American crocodile,
Crocodylus acutus and Morelet’s crocodile, Crocodylus moreletii). A few lobster fishers
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new settlers worked exclusively in the manufacture of fishing shades and cutting chit
palm (Thrinax radiata), used to construct the first shades and for roofing houses.
In this isolated settlement, social life was organized collectively; the few women living
there washed and cooked as a group. The group’s representatives in charge of market-
ing the product outside the community were responsible for bringing back basic sup-
plies. Some fishers’ wives accompanied their husbands on fishing trips, and prepared
food along the way.
During the early years of the cooperative in Punta Allen, lobster was distributed to
the city of Chetumal by sea, or was transported overland via a truck whose winding
route ran from the Vigía Chico Carrillo harbor and could take 2 or 3 days because of
the hostile terrain. Once the distributors managed to get out to the main road, the
product was brought to Merida, Chetumal and Felipe Carrillo Puerto. Along with lob-
ster, they transported turtle meat, one of the most popular seafoods at that time. Some
trips went as far as the Mexico City.
Control over access to common resources was organized from the early days of the
cooperative into three production groups, centered on three individuals with high lead-
ership capacity. Though the early leaders had different views on how the fishery should
be organized, the aforementioned conditions of geographic isolation, scarcity, and
rough roads forced them to combine their efforts to market the product and purchase
the products necessary for Punta Allen families’ subsistence. These leaders started fam-
ilies in the town, and today remain the power holders in the community. The first
leader, a founder of the community, came from a family of Spanish origin. He had little
formal education, but was highly skilled in the management of economic resources.
The second leader was the descendant of fishers who had participated in the formation
of the Cozumel cooperative, which he left due to a conflict. He was the driving force
behind the formation of the cooperative as the local mode of labor organization. The
third leader was known in the community for his conciliatory capacity. He came from
the area’s farming tradition and was the individual who conducted negotiations and
mediated between the community, NGOs and the government during the early years of
the community and cooperative.
At this time, a local fisher deployed the sombra technique introduced by the Cubans.
The new technology involved investment in materials, manpower and time during the
lobster harvest, and thus disputes over resource ownership emerged. The first fisher-
man to place a capture shade into the sea was followed by other fishers, who noted
where he was placing them with the intent of later stealing his catch. Another fisher
followed suit, placing his own sombras, but they suffered the same fate, and his catch
was stolen. These events were the genesis of the marine tenure system characteristic of
Punta Allen. The catch-stealing problem was resolved by a fisherman who had previ-
ously worked as a farmer in the municipality of Felipe Carrillo Puerto. He decided to
establish a fishing zone as a “parcelad”, bounding an area of marine space. Other fishers
imitated him and established that each fisher would have an assigned area in the sea
for lobster fishing, in which he could place shelters to catch lobsters, just as a farmer
would install infrastructure on his land. People in Punta Allen do not say that they fish
lobster; instead, they harvest lobster. This apparently minor linguistic shift carries im-
portant symbolic weight in their fishing practice.
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working groups. In the process of delimiting lobster fields, fishers who belonged to one
of the three major groups managed to defend their chosen marine territories and con-
solidate their ownership.
“When we began to divide the sea… it was terrible, there were fights in the cantina.
So that it wouldn’t go on for too long, I made groups… you know, don’t grab this
plot just for yourself, divide it among four; so, when someone fights with you, you
are going to fight as a foursome…whereas if you were alone, they would plaster you
in the cantina. They made groups… [so now] you are talking about how you are
going to fight six people, and it [acts as a deterrent]… I do not know if you
understand how the strategy works…” (Rodrigo, founder, member of the Board of
Directors, personal interview, April 20, 2013).
As the years passed and the cooperative matured, the families of these three leaders
became the community leaders. They were responsible for negotiations with govern-
mental institutions, participation in academic projects, and decision-making on how ac-
cess to resources in the zone was allocated. Since the cooperative’s inception, Mexico’s
Federal Cooperative Law (1938) served as a basis for regulating practices within the
community. However, this was not an easy task. The low level of formal educational
level of the majority of the fishers in the cooperative and the isolated geographic condi-
tions spawned constant trips to the State capital (Chetumal) to ask government author-
ities to serve as arbitrators in many disputes. These iterative learning interactions with
the State began to confer legitimate power on these leaders, who held administrative
positions on the Board of Directors.
“Before, no, we did not carry out our responsibilities because we didn’t know about
the performance of our activities, our responsibility… we always went and were told
‘that's what conciliation and arbitration are for, conflicts.... The surveillance guy,
that’s his job to see that all the committees work well, and [bring to the Board’s
attention] those that don’t, those are your duties’…” (Rodrigo, founder, member of
the Board of Directors, personal interview, April 20, 2013).
This reinforcement of the legitimation of local authority figures via state backing
helped ensure that interpretations of the Cooperatives Act would become instrumental
to the regulatory practices of the community. This process further promoted the co-
operative as the dominant form of community social organization. Notably, tourism,
which has become an important economic activity in the community, is regulated by
these same cooperative rules. The original leaders of the lobster cooperative continue
to hold power in almost all spheres of public life, and the descendants of these leaders
sustain this system of concentration of power.
Governmental organizations collaborate with the cooperative because of its implementa-
tion of sustainable extractive practices and its participation in the policing of marine con-
servation at a low cost to the State. Local fishers have firmly supported the surveillance
system because the Ascension Bay fishing concession, which was granted by the State, pro-
vides them with security over the resource and protects their internal system of regulation.
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changes in State policy during the Salinas de Gortari government (1988–1994). At that
time, the Fisheries Act was modified to include active private sector participation in
fishing extractive activities. Species reserved for exploitation by cooperatives disap-
peared from the Act and a new regime was designed to grant concessions, permissions
and authorizations, whereby these rights of use could be transferred to private inves-
tors. Additionally, early bids began for the sale of the state-owned enterprises Ocean
Garden and Mexican Fishery Products (Soberanes Fernández 1994; Cifuentes-Lemus
and Cupul-Magaña 2002). Even though cooperatives lost exclusive fishing rights under
these changes in national fisheries legislation, the cooperative continues to be the only
way the Punta Allen community can conceptualize the social organization of labor. The
cooperative was able to maintain and consolidate power, because since its early days
the founding leaders had respected state regulations, and used them to legitimize their
decisions. Through their repeated consultations with regional authorities, and long-
time adherence to State regulations, these leaders had strengthened their connections
with state agencies and actors in ways that continued to benefit them, and offer legitim-
acy, despite the changes in legislation.Responses to socio-environmental perturbations
When Hurricane Gilbert hit the coast of Quintana Roo in 1988, just 2 years after the
formalization of the Biosphere Reserve, the course of local fisheries changed unexpectedly.
The model of fishing had shifted at the federal level, with the 1983 implementation of the
Exploration and Assessment of Fisheries Resources of the Exclusive Economic Zone and
Territorial Waters program, a multi-agency and industry partnershipe. Its intent was to
estimate the resources that Mexico could extract from its exclusive economic zones and
territorial waters. With this measure, the State changed its discourse from one of resource
protection and regulation to one of deregulation. For each newly inventoried marine re-
source, trade values were assigned, and changes were introduced to fisheries legislation to
encourage the participation of the private sector, as well as foreign companies (Soberanes
Fernández 1994). The State also conducted an inventory of state-owned assets and com-
menced their sale. Multiple interviewees reported that before 1988, state-owned Mexican
Fishery Products and Ocean Garden had been economically important, and responsible for
most of the processing and distribution to packing companies in Quintana Roo (Soberanes
Fernández 1994). State-sponsored deregulation forced local fisheries to identify new ways
to survive in the national and international market.
The Punta Allen cooperative faced one of its worst financial crises in the 1990s. The
cooperative had enjoyed a boom in productivity a few years before Hurricane Gilbert struck
in 1988 with devastating impact. Several fishers recalled needless and excessive spending of
the cooperative’s financial resources in the mid-1980s. Given resource abundance and a
seemingly endless flow of money, people in the community were not concerned about
investing their earnings or consolidating family savings. The cooperative’s leaders did not
worry about money management, and expenses were often much higher than actual
income. The cooperative directors decided to build a packing plant in the town of Tulum,
55 km distant, to receive, package and market all products from the fishing cooperatives
in the State. The ice factory and baler were built first, followed by the marketing offices.
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for the marketing offices in a single payment. Construction began shortly before
Hurricane Gilbert hit the northern coasts of Quintana Roo. Lobster extraction
plummeted. Debts became unsustainable, and cooperative members learned about the
financial situation of the cooperative the hard way. Before the 1988 financial disaster,
the accountant and directors had kept the cooperative’s finances secret. Given this
situation, no one wanted to take charge of the bankrupt cooperative, and the responsi-
bility fell to the cooperative’s president. The cooperative’s debt far exceeded its product-
ive capacity, and many members left the community. Others, in despair over their low
incomes, sold lobsters outside of the cooperative. This clandestine selling became such
a problem that it seriously threatened the cooperative’s continued existence (for a
related example, see McCandless and Emery 2008).
The Board of Directors began to crack down on violators, initiating a wave of expulsions
of all members who violated the internal rules. The membership rolls shrank from approxi-
mately 120 to 70. In 1993, 5 years after Hurricane Gilbert, the cooperative managed to pay
off their debt to Ocean Garden, as well as to the Bank of Mexico. The cooperative also
decided not to accept new members, including former cooperative members who had left
the cooperative during the crisis. The children of former members also lost the right to
aspire to membership. After the debt crisis, only the children of current, active members
could become members, thereby effectively limiting resource access to a subset of the
community. Rights to lobster fields could only be sold to members of the cooperative, and
the cooperative regulated all transactions. The selling of a “lobster field” did not refer to the
marine parcel itself, but only to the improvements: the “shades” the previous rights-holder
had constructed. The cooperative re-emerged as a result of the restructuring of the internal
rules of operation. The reorganization had implications for the way fishery resource
property rights were protected, which subsequently permitted the cooperative to comply
with the requirements to obtain a fishing concession.Changes in focus and fishing gear
In the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, area residents harvested, turtle, shark and caiman, as well as
scaly fish. Although these were not primary economic activities, they represented a signifi-
cant portion of the revenues generated during the off-season for lobster. However, shortly
after the Sian Ka’an reserve was gazetted, government efforts shifted, following inter-
national trends set at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio. The new policies focused on the
diversification of productive activities to lessen the impact of extractive practices on area
ecosystems. The government’s intention was to put an end to fishing as a primary
commercial activity, and replace extractive practices with environmentally friendly
activities. As part of this policy, during the 1990s, the National Commission of Natural
Protected Areas (CONANP) engaged in an ongoing campaign to convince fishers to stop
fishing for turtle and caiman and abandon their fishing nets.
The perceived panacea for unsustainable resource use was tourism. The government
promoted tourist cooperatives running sightseeing tours, and some of the fishers created
the first tourist cooperatives in Punta Allen and Vigía Grande. The Gaytanes and Las
Boyas tourist cooperatives followed. More recently, area residents formed the Nativos de
la Bahía and the women’s Orquídeas de Sian Ka’an cooperatives (though at the time of
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ploration into tourist activities, the fishers decided to withdraw the use of fishing nets.
The rationale for this change was the nets’ negative impacts on the population of high
commercial-value sport-fishing species such as ladyfish (Elops saurus), snook (Centropo-
mus spp.), permit (Trachinotus falcatus), and dolphinfish (Coriphaena hippurus).
In the 1990s, tourism was already complementing family incomes, but it was not until
2000 that tourism became the most important economic activity in the community of
Punta Allen. Some fishers combined fishing and tourism, while other cooperative mem-
bers simply abandoned fishing. Over time, a series of tourism cooperatives emerged to
regulate the area’s resources, strengthening the local community’s decision-making cap-
acity. Influenced by external buyers, the remaining lobster fishers decided to change their
fishing gear, leaving the hook behind and shifting to the jamo. The change in fishing gear
was a response to the observed increase in commercial value of the undamaged product
harvested with the jamo.
Academics have also been important actors in this renewed fishery. At the beginning
of the 21st century, the cooperative requested support rom some of the universities and
research centers working in the region. Using new technologies, a map of all the lobster
fields was created. Previously, the local fishers had delimited the boundaries of their
lobster fields with buoys or stakes. Their profound knowledge of the marine space
allowed them to find the exact locations of their traps; however, they had never been
able to visualize the shape of each field or its actual dimensions. Academics taught
them how to use global-positioning systems (GPS), allowing the fishers to improve
their surveillance systems and resource usage. Researchers systematized the knowledge
about lobster population behavior and performed bathymetryf that was subsequently
incorporated into a database.
“…Through SISIERRA [a national research program]g, a map was made using GPS,
and it was from that point that we learned the shape of our lobster fields… if you
were my neighbor along my boundary, I knew you were my neighbor and where you
were, but I didn’t know about the others; when we did the mapping in 2001, each of
us saw. This is something that we had always wanted, that information could be
provided to us (by the academics)… so when this young man showed us the GPS,
boom! Our eyes opened…the objective was to map, but now we use the GPS to
locate the lobster shades….”(Ramiro, founder, member of the Board of Directors,
personal interview, March 6, 2013).
Through these collaborations, the fishers continued to expand and formalize their
knowledge of their primary resource, and the environment in which lobster fishing
takes place. This knowledge gave them greater negotiating power and control relative
to other stakeholders involved in territorial management. All of these processes re-
sulted in a very particular way of understanding territory. The fishery’s continued ad-
vancement within a conservation area, and the establishment of the Biosphere Reserve,
add additional layers of regulation on permissible resource use within those boundaries.
The capacity of the Reserve to formally grant and preclude access came to establish a kind
of invisible lock that protected the local cooperative and their property rights over the
fishery resources, whilst excluding others.
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As mentioned earlier, the Fisheries Act of 1999 recognized two types of usage rights for fish-
ery resources: permits and concessions (DOF 1999). That the Punta Allen cooperative ob-
tained the latter is key to understanding their success and re-emergence. The radical
difference between permits and concessions lies in the temporality of rights and forms of
access. Under the Fisheries Act, concessions are granted based on an evaluation of the re-
sults of technical and economic studies, as well as the amount and predicted recovery time
of the investment. It can be granted for up to 50 years. Concessions give rights over benthic
resources (such as lobster) in defined geographic areas (Ramírez Félix and Manzo Monroy
2004). Permits are granted for smaller investments and do not require technical and eco-
nomic studies. For permits, only the nature of the activities is evaluated, and the ownership
of the required fishing gear and vessels must be demonstrated (1999 Fisheries Act regula-
tions). While concessions, as a type of right-to-use, are regulated under Mexican law, their
application is not an everyday practice in Mexican fisheries, because this kind of access right
is not easy to obtain. Though policy at the federal level showed a trend towards deregulation
of resources and the inclusion of private capital in extractive practices, in 1993 the fishery
cooperative in the Punta Allen community obtained an exclusive 20-year concession for
lobster fishing in the Bay of Ascension. This achievement is a significant example of the
Punta Allen community’s success—most fishing cooperatives in Mexico are not sufficiently
well-organized or economically strong enough to obtain such a concession.
The Vigía Chico cooperative received this concession because of their internal
organization and marketing capacity, as well as the support of various non-governmental
and academic organizations. The cooperative’s receipt of this concession is highly signifi-
cant. The cooperative can then confer rights, also known as concessions, on its authorized
users. They provide local fishers with tenured security over their resources and the oppor-
tunity to develop future strategies to continue fishing in the area. Those rights, though, are
not guaranteed, and must be actively husbanded.
“…There is a lot of private initiative behind these concessions, so even if you’ve had
it, it could happen. Although I have lived here for years, I will go into tourism, but if
I lost my concession…it could happen even if I have the concession that I could lose
it, if I didn’t care for it; it has a lifespan, it expires…it’s not as simple as I want it and
it is given to me. You have to fulfill certain requirements…but there are interested
parties…the director [of the Reserve] already mentioned to us that there are people
after them [for the concession]… then anything we fail to do…” (Ramiro, founder,
member of the Board of Directors, personal interview, April 13, 2013).
The cooperative’s concession allows local fishers to use this renewable rights-granting
mechanism to reinforce their systems of resource policing, and exert ongoing pressure
on State authorities to support them in this process. The concession also gives local
stakeholders the mechanism to obtain greater control over the organization of extractive
practices, via participation in the defense of national sovereignty occurring within their
local territory.
“…We cannot detain a person because we are civilians, so when we go about our
operation, we bring the military, as clearly we are civilians… [The military] are
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say, a pirate.... We operate by boat, dragging and towing the boat, and bring them up
here…with the Marines…. Since we go out on operations, we have to assemble three
elements. We are going to go prepared, because we can’t go find them [pirates] and
then later bring the Marines; [it has to be] all at once, three marines or four to set
out…” (Rodrigo, founder, member of the Board of Directors, personal interview,
April 20, 2013).
The maritime space of the Bay of Ascension, granted in concession as a common
property to a productive social organization, effectively becomes the locus of inter-
action between various stakeholders. Tourism cooperatives, fishing cooperatives, non-
governmental organizations, state agencies and entities and academia have negotiated a
shared understanding of the resource—and the space it occupies—resulting in sustain-
able management practices.
Throughout the process of settlement, the Punta Allen community developed an
awareness of the importance of adhering to state policies in order to pursue their liveli-
hood activities. The cooperative creatively introduced and adapted these policy pre-
scriptions into their local system of rules. Specially, three significant strategies were
developed. First, the cooperative was not only designed and perceived as an organization
focused on the productive aspects of fisheries, but also as the primary social institution in
the community. Second, cooperative members recognized the Sian Ka’an Biosphere Re-
serve as an effective organizing structure to support their exclusive management of the
marine space. Finally, fishing concessions were effectively deployed as a strategy to control
extractive resources access.
Conclusions
To fully understand the success of the Punta Allen lobster fishery we carefully reviewed
the settlement history of the community, which yielded a particular social structure.
Today, we can trace the positive impacts of forms of spatial and institutional organization
linked to particular lobster fishing strategies. These forms of organization have shaped the
life of Punta Allen, and now extend beyond the fishery to influence other economic sec-
tors. In Punta Allen, the cooperative, in tandem with the community, has developed a ro-
bust, well-tended and strictly enforced system of rights. Through them, the cooperative
and community ensure sustainable resource use: they have fostered tourism as an import-
ant new dominant economic activity, while still profiting from lobster extraction. We
identified several factors enabling this particular set of socio-environmental relationships.
One of these factors was the isolated conditions incomers had to confront during the
early days of settlement. Difficulties in marketing the fishing catch, which was necessary
to purchase goods needed for survival, forced the villagers to address community issues
collectively. The strong community bonds motivated the three leaders, who originally
departed from a top-down decision-making approach, to find ways to integrate the
existing knowledge and worldviews of community members into collective forms of ac-
tion. These initial leaders’ capacity and willingness to be advised on the legal mecha-
nisms to exercise the rights and obligations as a cooperative also proved critical.
Understanding the inner workings of these legal mechanisms allowed the community
to effectively integrate federal laws and regulations into local policy and practice. This
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to the community’s modes of social organization, thereby strengthening locally estab-
lished systems of sanctions and community rights, as in the Maine lobster fisheries case
analyzed by Acheson and Brewer (2003). Cooperative working relationships with re-
gional representatives of various state institutions and NGOs also advanced the com-
munity and cooperative’s legitimacy in the eyes of government officials.
The ongoing presence and interest of academics in the community has helped to
legitimize the state’s strategy of enforcing conservation measures while allowing ex-
tractive activities. It has simultaneously positioned academics as mediators between the
state and local actors. For example, at the time of writing, local fishers and academics
are working together to generate a resource inventory, to enable reliable monitoring of
natural resources and generate valid indicators for sustainable resource use. This re-
source inventory will provide the basis for greater scientific management capacity, fur-
ther legitimating the cooperative’s activities and establishing a better position for
negotiations with other involved stakeholders. Their position may come to resemble
that of the concessionaires of Central Baja California, Mexico (see Orensanz et al.
2013; McCay et al. 2014). At the same time, the group’s locally and academically co-
produced knowledge of the characteristics of the resource and the institutions involved
in its regulation makes users aware of which practices might affect both the resource
and the group’s existence over the long term. This helps the community keep its in-
formed interests at the forefront of negotiations with government agencies and buyers.
Market influence fostering changes in fishing technique and equipment have also re-
peatedly influenced the fishery, increasing the value of the spiny lobster as a product
and improving fishers’ income. More recently, changes in gear have reduced impacts
on the area’s marine ecosystem. Furthermore, the biogeographic conditions of the bay
imposed challenges on inhabitants, forcing them to increase their degree of cooperation
and improving their capacity to respond to perturbations, such as hurricanes. This gave
the community the ability to understand the significance of cooperation for achieving
goals. The ecological and economic perturbation following the aftermath of Hurricane
Gilbert offered a window into the potential socioeconomic consequences of a livelihood
scenario without fishing. That crisis also forced cooperative members to rethink the
system of rules that allow or prohibit group membership and to strengthen its system
of internal rules.
The success of this particular community is influenced by a complex of socio-
environmental factors not shared by all artisanal fishing communities globally. Even
given its particularity, an analysis of the historical foundations of this particular case
allows us to identify indicators worth taking into account in fisheries management
more broadly. Punta Allen’s Vigía Chico Cooperative increasingly serves as a model
for other fishing cooperatives, as well as for NGOs and government bodies. These vis-
itors are gradually developing efforts to reproduce elsewhere some of the mechanisms
that have maintained the strength of the Punta Allen cooperative over more than
three decades. We hope that our detailed analysis contributes to these efforts.
Today, fishing in Mexico presents many challenges. Fishing permits, when granted,
apply to the entire Mexican coast. Government monitoring efforts are inadequate. The
result is an institutional apparatus that has been unable to meet the challenges of fish-
eries management. However, despite the policy of deregulation, the undoing of legislation
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pressure exerted by private initiatives to access high-commercial-value resources, the
Punta Allen cooperative persists. Its continued success offers a clear example of how
locally generated, tended and enforced rules can be legitimated and strengthened by
strategic engagement with State regulations and regulators. Together with the support
of ongoing innovation and collaboration with outside experts, these practices can sup-
port successful management.
The Punta Allen cooperative has managed to engage with available governance mech-
anisms and technologies and collectively fit them to their local context. Their adapt-
ability and tenacity has permitted them to successfully negotiate the shifting terrain of
a succession of state actors, policies, and priorities, as well as market and environmen-
tal shifts. Equally important has been how the different stakeholders interact in a terri-
tory of economic, ecological and strategic importance at the regional and national level.
This case, and other studies of successful artisanal fisheries reviewed here, show the
multiple benefits that accrue when different stakeholders work tenaciously to reconcile
their interests. Through direct negotiations, legitimacy derived from adherence to regula-
tory standards and scientific management, processes of exclusion, and skillful engagement
of different parties in the performance of everyday practices, Punta Allen’s success attests
that well-organized local groups can secure viable fisheries and coastal livelihoods.
Endnotes
aThe shelters or shades are made with concrete and represent an artificial refuge for
lobsters. This fishing gear allows the selective capture of live lobster, decreasing damage
to juveniles and egg-bearing females, which are returned to the sea during fishing season
(Seijo 1993).
bThe jamo is a net that is used to collect lobsters without injuring them. It resembles
a butterfly net, but is woven from very strong fishing line.
cThe time during which this president held office was called Cardenismo, and was
characterized by its policy of support for the working class, land distribution, the pro-
motion of the cooperative movement and the nationalization of property (see León and
Marván 1999; Semo 1993).
d“Parcela,” or parcel, is a term that farmers use to designate their agricultural plots.
eIn 1983, during the presidential tenure of Miguel de la Madrid, the "Program of Ex-
ploration and Assessment of Fisheries Resources of the Exclusive Economic Zone and
the Territorial Waters” was initiated with the participation of the Secretary of the Navy,
the National Council of Science and Technology, the National Cooperative Conference
of the Mexican Republic, the National Chamber of the Fishing Industry, the state-
owned company Mexican Fishery Products, the National Autonomous University of
Mexico and the National Polytechnic and other universities in the province. Its purpose
was to estimate fishery resources for allocation (Soberanes Fernández 1994).
fBathymetry is the study of the relief of the seabed and its depth contours.
gSISIERRA (Sistema de Investigación Justo Sierra) was the name of a research pro-
gram founded by CONACYT, the National Council of Science and Technology (2001).Competing interests
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